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Abstract
The current research advances an interdependence analysis of commuting decisions
(i.e. commuting by car versus public transportation), delineating the determinants of
an individual’s outcomes in terms of own decisions, other commuters’ decisions, and
the combination or interaction of own and others’ decisions (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978). Consistent with hypotheses, findings revealed that a concern with comfort led
to a higher overall personal preference for the car, and a lower overall preference
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for others to commute by public transportation, when compared to a concern with
travel time. Additionally, consistent with the claim that commuter decisions are also
guided by considerations broader than a concern with individual outcomes, findings
revealed that individuals with prosocial orientations (i.e. those concerned with
maximizing collective outcomes) in combination with high levels of trust (i.e.
believing in the honesty and cooperative intentions of others) exhibited a greater
overall personal preference for public transportation, and a reduced desire to avoid
other commuters, relative to individuals with a prosocial orientation and low levels
of trust, or a proself orientation (i.e. those concerned primarily with maximizing
own outcomes), regardless of levels of trust. Finally, consistent with the current
interdependence analysis, intention to commute by car was positively associated with
not only overall personal preference for the car, but also with the desire to avoid
other commuters.
INTRODUCTION
In 1963 the world’s problems seemed a lot more significant to me than the
graphs, matrices, and other abstractions that confronted me as a student in
mathematics. And so I went out to do good in, and to try to understand, the
world. Two years later I returned to graduate school, only to learn that the
world’s problems were graphs and matrices, or at least could be better analyzed
in terms of them.
Hamburger (1979, p. ix)
With respect to one’s impact on the environment, one of the most important
decisions an individual must make involves his/her choice of transportation (Stern,
1992). The use of automobiles, while generally convenient, contributes to serious
environmental problems including global warming, acid rain, resource depletion,
noise pollution, and congestion (Lowe, 1990). Despite these problems, the majority
of commuters around the world continue to rely on the car (Newman & Kenworthy,
1989). To gain an understanding of commuting decisions, many past studies have
attempted to identify relevant travel attributes and demographic characteristics
associated with travel mode choice. Findings from this literature indicate the
importance of a variety of variables including cost, convenience, reliability, travel
time, and comfort (Bronner, 1982; Fenwick, Heeler, & Simmie, 1983; Norman, 1977;
Norman & Louviere, 1974; Paine, Nash, Hille, & Brunner, 1969), socioeconomic
status (Flannely & McLeod, 1989), and the number of available automobiles within
a household (Flannely & McLeod, 1989; Hsu, 1975). The present paper takes a
somewhat different approach to the problem, analysing commuting decisions from
the perspective of Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) theory of interdependence. Our
primary goal in this regard is to provide a unified framework in which to understand
how individual concerns (e.g. travel time and comfort), as well as broader
considerations (e.g. concern with collective well-being and trust in others’ honesty
and cooperative intentions) impact the decision to commute to work by car or public
transportation.
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An interdependence analysis of commuting decisions
Overview
Pollution; resource deletion; and congestion: each problem highlights the fact that
commuters are socially interdependent. By definition, interdependence involves two
or more decision makers who exercise, to a greater or lesser extent, varying forms of
control over their own and others’ outcomes. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) identify
three types of control underlying interdependent outcomes, each of which has
interesting applications of commuting decisions, including own control over one’s
own outcomes (i.e. reflexive control), others’ control over one’s own outcomes (i.e.
fate control), and joint control over one’s own outcomes (i.e. behaviour control). For
example, the time required to commute to work by car or public transportation is
determined, at least in part, by one’s own commuting decision (reflexive control), by
how many others choose the car or public transportation (fate control), and by
whether one avoids or joins the majority of other commuters (behaviour control).
One useful method for assessing the type and degree of control individuals have
over interdependent outcomes is to formally represent such outcomes as a matrix
specifying the decision makers, their behavioural alternatives, and the outcomes
associated with various self–other choice combinations. For instance, the decision to
commute by car or public transportation can be conceptualized as a 262 outcome
matrix in which the rows correspond to a commuter’s own decision, and the columns
to the decision of most other commuters1. Subsequently, using an analysis of
variance model (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), the resulting pattern of outcomes, known
as the interdependence structure, can be described in terms of reflexive control (i.e.
the ‘main effect’ of own decisions), fate control (i.e. the ‘main effect’ of others’
decisions), and behaviour control (i.e. the ‘interaction’ of own and others’ decisions).
The present paper utilizes this general approach, modifying slightly, Kelley and
Thibaut’s (1978) control (i.e. variance) components to reflect directionalized
preference indices, as illustrated in Table 12.
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1Outcome matrices, while extremely popular among social psychologists (e.g. Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977),
have not been without their critics (e.g. Nemeth, 1972). First, it seems unlikely that decision makers think
in terms of outcome matrices. Indeed, many of the strongest proponents of this approach readily admit
that the matrix is ‘. . . not intended to stand as a literal representation of lay cognition, emotion, or
motivation’ but rather, should be thought of as ‘. . . simply a rich and efficient conceptual tool for
identifying and formally representing the essential features of interaction phenomenon. . .’ (Rusbult & Van
Lange, in press, pp. 7–8). Second, the 262 matrix is, necessarily, smaller than the n-dimensional matrix
representing all decision makers. But, as Liebrand (1983) has noted, despite the increased anonymity and
wider dispersion of negative consequences of one’s own behaviour in an n-person setting, the 262 and n-
person decision structures are identical. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume here that the 262 matrix can
serve as a useful model of the interdependence structure underlying multi-person commuting decisions.
2The distinction is analogous to differentiating (a) the between-groups variance estimates for the row main
effect, the column main effect, and the interaction from (b) the mean differences for rows, columns, and
diagonals, respectively. To illustrate, using somewhat more applied terms, assume that a commuter, faced
with a choice between the car and public transportation, has a large amount of reflexive control over travel
comfort (i.e. a main effect of the self). This indicates that one form of transportation, on average, affords
more comfort than the other, but it does not indicate which form of transportation the commuter views as
most comfortable. In our modification of Kelley and Thibaut’s reflexive, fate, and behaviour control
components, we retain information regarding the direction of the preference for self, others, and
coordination, respectively, as illustrated in Table 1.
The first matrix in Table 1 shows that if ‘Sarah’ decides to go by car, while the
majority of others decide to go by public transportation, Sarah’s outcome is a2b1.
Sarah’s outcome in cell a2b1 of the second matrix (i.e. 50; where higher values reflect
more attractive outcomes) is the result of three components, including Sarah’s own
overall satisfaction with the car, her overall satisfaction with others’ decision for
public transportation, and her satisfaction with avoiding the majority of other
commuters. More generally, each outcome in the second matrix reflects a particular
combination of Sarah’s preference for self, preference for others, and preference for
coordination. The preference for self index (15), computed as a difference between
the car (35) and public transportation (20) row averages, can be interpreted as a
commuter’s overall preference for the car (positive values) or public transportation
(negative values). The preference for others index (5), computed as a difference
between the car (30) and public transportation (25) column averages, reflects a
commuter’s overall preference for others to commute by car (positive values) or
public transportation (negative values). And, the preference for coordination index
(25), computed as a difference between the average minor (40) and major (15)
diagonals, can be taken as a commuter’s preference for coordinating actions in order
to avoid (positive values) or join (negative values) other commuters.
The commuters’ interdependence structure
Frequently, the analysis of real-world interdependence problems starts by assuming,
a priori, that a certain interdependence structure (or outcome matrix) characterizes a
particular real-world problem (for exceptions, see Kollock, 1995; Lumsden, 1973;
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Table 1. Three forms of preference underlying commuters’ jointly determined outcomes
Commuting as a 262 matrix
General form Example of
of matrix outcomes
Majority of others outcomesa
PTb Car
Sarah PT a1b1 a1b2 *
10 30 20
Sarah car a2b1 a2b2 50 20 35
30 25
Preference indices
Preference for selfc=35 720=15 (prefers self to take the car)
Preference for othersd=25 730=75 (prefers others to take public transportation)
Preference for coordinatione=40 715=25 (prefers to avoid other commuters)
aRow chooser’s outcomes only; higher values represent more attractive outcomes.
bPT=public transportation. cPreference for self=(car row average 7PT row average). dPreference for
others=(car column average 7PT column average). ePreference for coordination=[(a2b1+a1b2)/
2]7[(a1b1+a2b2)/2].
Plous, 1993). For example, it seems reasonable to assume that commuting decisions
contain elements of a social dilemma, formally defined as a situation in which (a)
each individual receives greater outcomes by making a noncooperative decision (i.e.
the car) than by making a cooperative decision (i.e. public transportation),
irrespective of others’ decisions, yet (b) each individual is better off if all make a
cooperative rather than a noncooperative decision (cf. Dawes, 1980; Messick &
Brewer, 1983). Clearly, the adoption of a well-specified interdependence model for a
particular problem has its benefits, as it affords tools for conceptualizing,
abstracting, and modelling key features of situations that may influence
interdependent decision making (for reviews, see Komorita & Parks, 1994; Van
Lange & Messick, in press). However, many of these benefits hinge on a researcher’s
ability to ‘. . . properly abstract [a particular] situation’ (Hamburger, 1979, p. 83), an
ability which may be questioned in light of professional disagreement over the
‘appropriate’ interdependence model underlying certain real-world problems (e.g.
Komorita & Parks, 1994; Liebrand, 1983). Moreover, as outlined below, there are
strong theoretical grounds for expecting decision makers to perceive the underlying
structure of the same situation differently.
A variety of factors can influence an individual’s perception of the
interdependence structure—defined in terms of preference for self, others, and
coordination—underlying a particular problem. To organize such factors, Kelley
and Thibaut (1978) draw a distinction between two types of outcome matrices. The
so-called given matrix, determined (i.e. ‘given’) by features of the situation as well as
individuals’ needs and abilities, represents the outcomes associated with individual
concerns (e.g. travel time and comfort). The so-called effective matrix, determined by
both the given matrix, as well as broader considerations (e.g. concern with collective
well-being, and trust in other’s honesty and cooperative intentions), represents the
matrix of outcomes which individuals ultimately perceive as the structure of
interdependence. In reaching a final decision, individuals are said to transform the
given into an effective matrix which is more closely linked to actual behaviour. Based
on the preceding framework, the current research examines (a) two possible
determinants of given matrix preferences, including a concern with travel time and a
concern with comfort, (b) two possible determinants of effective matrix preferences,
including a commuter’s social value orientation (i.e. preferences for certain patterns
of outcomes to self and others; McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968) and
trust (i.e. beliefs regarding the honesty and cooperative intentions of others;
Yamagishi, 1986), and (c) the relative importance of the given versus effective matrix
preferences in predicting commuter intentions.
Determinants of given matrix preferences: individual commuting concerns
Two individual concerns closely linked to commuting preferences include a concern
with comfort and a concern with travel time (e.g. Fenwick et al., 1983; Newman &
Kenworthy, 1989; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995; Van Vugt, Van Lange,
& Meertens in press). How might such concerns influence commuters’ preferences
for self (i.e. overall, car or public transportation), others (i.e. overall, car or public
transportation), and coordination (i.e. join or avoid the majority of other
commuters) within the given matrix? First, it seems reasonable to assume that
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personal comfort reflects a goal that can be largely achieved by an individual’s own
decision, and is therefore not likely to be strongly influenced by others’ decisions, or
a specific combination of own and others’ decisions. That is, when comfort is the
primary concern, commuters should be fairly independent, rather than
interdependent. As such, framing the commuting situation in terms of comfort
would be associated primarily with a strong overall self preference for the car. This
reasoning is consistent with recent theoretical and empirical work on commuting
decisions which suggests that the decision to commute by car or public
transportation can be modelled as a trade-off between personal comfort and the
environment, with an underlying structure approximating the N-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Van Vugt et al., 1995). According to this model, each commuter prefers
the car, regardless of other commuters’ choices—as it is the most personally
comfortable option—but if all commuters take the car, everyone is worse off than if
all had taken public transportation, as overdependence on cars contributes to serious
environmental problems (Lowe, 1990).
By contrast, when travel time is the more prominent concern, individuals are more
likely interdependent, and this concern gives rise to an interdependence structure
that is substantially different from the one instigated by a concern with comfort.
Specifically, while commuting by car tends to be associated with lower travel time
than commuting by public transportation, this advantage can turn into a
disadvantage depending on other commuters’ decisions. Thus, if individuals are
concerned with travel time, they should prefer avoiding other commuters,
commuting by car if most others are believed to commute by public
transportation, and commuting by public transportation if most others are
believed to commute by car. This reasoning is consistent with an alternative model
of commuting decisions as an accessibility problem with a structure approximating
either an N-person Chicken Dilemma, or a Battle of the Sexes game (e.g. Liebrand,
1983; Van Vugt et al., 1994, 1995). In these models, a commuter’s best travel option,
to a large extent, depends on the decisions made by other commuters; if a large
number of others take public transportation, a commuter is better off taking the car,
since the roads should be relatively empty, and public transportation may be
crowded and marked by delays caused by heavy demand; alternatively, if most
others take the car, a commuter is better off taking public transportation, since this
allows the commuter to avoid a traffic jam.
On the basis of the previous reasoning, we predict that commuters will exhibit a
higher overall preference for the car, irrespective of other commuters’ decisions,
when comfort rather than travel time is the primary concern (hypothesis 1a).
Moreover, we predict that commuters will exhibit a higher preference for avoiding
other commuters when travel time rather than comfort is the primary concern
(hypothesis 1b). Finally, there is also reason to expect that when travel time is the
primary concern, commuters will desire other commuters to commute by public
transportation rather than by car, regardless of the commuter’s own decision. This
reasoning is based on the notion that from a travel time perspective (a) individuals
will exhibit some tendency to prefer commuting by car, and (b) commuting by car is
more strongly influenced by others’ commuting decisions than is commuting by
public transportation (i.e. delays caused by traffic jams are larger than those caused
by overcrowded trains and buses). This pattern is to be contrasted with the idea that
personal comfort derived from cars is a goal that can be achieved largely
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independent of others’ commuting decisions. Thus, we predict that individuals will
exhibit a stronger desire for others to commute by public transportation when travel
time rather than comfort is the primary concern (hypothesis 1c).
Determinants of effective matrix preferences: social value orientation and trust
The basis of the hypotheses presented in the preceding section was an explicit link
between specific travel-related concerns and certain well-defined interdependence
structures. At a more general level, apart from any particular commuting concern, it
seems reasonable to assume that the decision to commute by car or public
transportation contains elements of a social dilemma, a situation in which individual
interests and collective interests are at odds. Although it is often argued that pursuit
of individual well-being is the only rational choice in such dilemmas (e.g. Luce &
Raffia, 1957), a notable percentage of people do behave in a collectively-beneficial
fashion. One factor consistently found to influence behaviour in social dilemmas is
an individual’s social value orientation. Individuals with prosocial orientations (i.e.
those concerned with maximizing joint outcomes) exercise greater restraint, and
exhibit greater cooperation than do individualists (i.e. those concerned with
maximizing own outcomes) or competitors (i.e. those concerned with maximizing
their relative advantage over others; e.g. Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Kramer,
McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986; Sattler &
Kerr, 1991). Prior research has also revealed that individualists and competitors
demonstrate a number of behavioural and cognitive similarities in simulations of
commuters’ dilemmas (Van Vugt et al., 1995), as well as in experimental games
simulating two-person or multiple-person social dilemmas (e.g. Kramer et al., 1986;
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Thus, the current research focuses on comparisons of
individuals with prosocial orientations and proself orientations (i.e. individualists
and competitors; cf. Kramer et al., 1986; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991).
Recently, it has been proposed that social value orientations influence commuters’
perception of the interdependence structure underlying commuting decisions (Van
Vugt et al., 1995). Prosocials are proposed to view commuting decisions as a trade-
off between personal comfort and the environment, whereas proselfs, given their
concern with their own well-being, are believed to interpret commuting decisions as
an accessibility problem in which they seek to achieve the fastest travel time. How
might such interpretations influence commuters’ preferences for self, others, and
coordination within the effective (or transformed) interdependence structure? First,
given their emphasis on collective concerns, prosocials should exhibit a stronger
overall preference for public transportation compared to proselfs (hypothesis 2a), as
public transportation is better for the environment (Lowe, 1990). Second, given their
concern with travel time, proselfs should be interested in commuting by car when the
majority of others commute by public transportation, and commuting by public
transportation when the majority of others commute by car. In contrast, given that
prosocials presumably are less concerned with travel time, their preferences should
be less influenced by beliefs regarding others’ commuting decisions. Thus, we predict
that, relative to prosocials, proselfs will exhibit a stronger preference for avoiding
other commuters (hypothesis 2b). Finally, both prosocials and proselfs have reason
to judge others’ choice for public transportation favourably; prosocials because
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public transportation is better for the environment, and proselfs because a majority
of public transportation users would mean relatively unobstructed highways. As
such, no formal hypothesis is advanced regarding the preference for others’
commuting behaviour.
Another factor that is assumed to influence how given matrices are transformed
into effective ones is trust, a general belief in the honesty and cooperative intentions
of others. Individuals who believe that others hold cooperative intentions or are
honest are considerably more cooperative than those who believe that others do not
hold such intentions or are not honest (Alcock & Mansell, 1977; Deutsch, 1960;
Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994). Moreover, research has revealed that trust represents preexisting individual
differences between people, a variable which also is related to cooperation in social
dilemmas (Yamagishi, 1992). However, individuals with high, as opposed to low,
trust do not always exhibit greater cooperation (e.g. Parks, 1994), suggesting that
trust may be a necessary yet not sufficient requirement for cooperation.
In their goal/expectation theory, Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) assume that two
conditions must be met to obtain cooperation: individuals should (a) hold
cooperative goals, and (b) expect others to exhibit cooperation. Although this
theory has been formulated to account for cooperation in two-person social
dilemmas, there is good reason to believe that a similar process is operative in
large-scale situations that share elements of social dilemmas. Applied to
commuting decisions, it is reasonable to propose that individuals who expect
others to make pro-environment decisions (i.e. those with high trust) will also
make pro-environment decisions as long as such individuals are concerned with
collective outcomes (i.e. if they hold a prosocial orientation). By contrast,
individuals with high trust are unlikely to hold pro-environmental preferences, if
such individuals tend to consider primarily outcomes for self (i.e. hold a proself
orientation). What about individuals with a prosocial orientation, but low levels of
trust? It seems reasonable to assume that commuters who are generally disposed to
make pro-environment decisions but are pessimistic regarding others’ willingness to
cooperate may feel like a ‘sucker’ if they are the only ones contributing to a
healthy environment. It is also possible that such individuals will fail to make pro-
environment decisions out of a concern that their own sacrifices for the
environment will make little difference (cf. perceived efficacy; Kerr, 1989).
Accordingly, we advance the following two predictions. First, we predict that
relative to individuals with either proself orientations or low trust or both,
individuals with both prosocial orientations and high trust will exhibit a weaker
preference for commuting by car (hypothesis 3a). Second, assuming that travel time
is a less important individual concern for prosocial individuals with high trust,
relative to the other three groups, we predict that prosocial individuals with high
trust will exhibit a weaker preference for avoiding other commuters (hypothesis 3b).
Predicting intended commuting behaviour from given and effective matrix preferences
An important assumption underlying the current interdependence analysis is that
factors above and beyond simply an individual’s overall preference play an
important role in an individual’s ultimate decision (e.g. intention to commute by
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car or public transportation). Focusing on the effective matrix preference indices, an
obvious prediction is that a higher overall self-preference for the car will be
associated with a stronger intention to commute by car (hypothesis 4a). But, to
what extent, and in what fashion, should additional features of the effective
interdependence structure relate to commuting intentions? First, as others’
commuting behaviour represents a feature of the relationship which one cannot
personally control, differing preferences for others’ commuting behaviour should
not predict one’s own intention to commute by car versus public transportation.
Second, because the desire to avoid other commuters in order to reduce travel time
can be interpreted as representing more self-interested preferences, a stronger desire
to avoid other commuters should be associated with a stronger intention to
commute by car (hypothesis 4b). A second assumption underlying the current
interdependence analysis is that the effective matrix is more representative of
ultimate preferences than is the given matrix. To the extent this assumption is
correct, the effective matrix preferences should be more highly predictive of stated
intention to commute by care when compared to preferences from either of the
given matrices, based respectively on travel time and comfort (hypothesis 5).
METHOD
Participants and procedure
Participants consisted of daily car and public transportation commuters recruited at
Amsterdam’s central train station and a gas station along a primary commuting
route near Amsterdam (the A-1), between the hours of 7.00–10.00 am and
2.00–6.00 pm. Potential participants were asked if they were on their way to work,
and if so, whether they would be willing to complete a short survey on commuting
decisions. Those who agreed received a survey with free postage, which they could
later complete at home or at work. Of the 360 surveys handed out, 102 were returned
(45 from gas stations and 57 from the train station). Respondents included 63 males,
38 females, and one sex-unidentified, with a mean age of 33 years and 2 months.
Assessment of social value orientation and trust
Participants’ social value orientation was assessed using a set of nine, three-
alternative decomposed games (Messick & McClintock, 1968), adapted from Van
Lange and Kuhlman (1994). As an example, in the first game participants chose
between three options offering points to Self and Other: A=480 Self, 80 Other;
B=540 Self, 280 Other; C=480 Self, 480 Other. In this game a competitor would
choose A (highest relative gain), an individualist B (highest own gain) and a
cooperator C (highest joint gain). To be classified, a participant had to demonstrate
a consistent preference for one of the three orientations in at least six of the nine
games. On this basis, 88 of the 102 participants (86 per cent) were classifiable,
including 47 prosocials (30 males, 17 females), 21 individualists (14 males, seven
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females), and 20 competitors (11 males, eight females, one sex-unidentified). As
outlined in the Introduction, we were primarily interested in—and we thus
created—two more general orientations including prosocials (cooperators or
altruists) and proselfs (individualists and competitors), a common convention
among researchers of social value orientations (cf. Kramer et al., 1986; Van Lange &
Liebrand, 1991; Van Vugt et al., 1995). Trust was assessed using a standard 5-item
scale, developed by Yamagishi (1986), which contains items addressing both the
extent to which participants believe others are generally honest (e.g. most people tell
a lie when they can benefit by doing so), and the degree to which trusting others is
risky (e.g. those devoted to unselfish causes are often exploited by others).
Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with five such statements on a
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). While the reliability of the scale
was less than optimal (alpha=0.54), we judged it to be acceptable, considering the
multifaceted nature of the items, as well as the scale’s predictive validity in prior
social dilemma research (e.g. Parks, 1994; Yamagishi, 1986; Yamagishi & Sato,
1986). Hence, trust was subsequently dichotomized on the basis of a median split on
participants’ average resonse to all five items on the trust scale (median=3.8 on a
7-point scale). Social value orientation was measured prior to participants’ reading
of the commuting scenario, while trust was assessed after participants completed the
current commuting experiences questionnaire.
The commuting scenario
The survey contained a series of tasks related to both hypothetical and real-life
commuting decisions. Following the assessment of social value orientation,
participants read the following3 hypothetical commuting scenario:
Imagine you are living on the outskirts of a medium size city. You hold a job in
the centre of town, working Monday through Friday, from 8 am to 5 pm. Thus,
you must commute to and from work during rush hour. In order to get to work
you can either use your car—a 1992 compact car with 32,000 kilometres
(20,000 miles)—or public transportation. If you take your car, your journey
will involve a commute plus a short walk from the parking space to your office.
If you take public transportation, your journey will involve a short walk from
your home to the train stop, a ride on the train, and a short walk from the train
to your office.
When all the costs associated with the car are figured in, including gas,
parking etc., commuting by car and commuting by public transportation will
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3For exploratory purposes, half of the surveys contained a longer scenario explaining that travel time
would ‘to some extent depend on the behaviour of other commuters’, such that matching the behaviour of
others could result in more variable travel times. As expected, preference for avoiding other commuters in
the travel time matrix was significantly higher in the longer scenario (M=41.24, S.D=24.36, n=37) than
in the shorter scenario described in the Methods section (M=22.74, S.D.=27.02, n=47), t(83)=3.25,
p50.01. In addition, preference for others to commute by public transportation—denoted by negative
values—in the effective matrix was significantly stronger in the short as opposed to the long scenario
(Mshort=739.08, S.D.=31.50; Mlong=17.76, S.D.=32.92; t(87)=3.10, p50.01). As the type of scenario
was unrelated to social value orientation, trust, and the combination thereof, and the type of scenario did
not modify the effects of primary interest, this variable will not be further discussed.
be equally expensive. In addition, while travel time for the two alternatives may
vary from day to day, on average, getting to work by car or by public
transportation will take the same amount of time.
Matrix framing
After reading the scenario, participants rank ordered (1=best, 4=worst) four
possible commuting situations resulting from a combination of their own choice (car,
public transportation) and the choice of the majority of others (car, public
transportation). The four situations appeared in a 262 table, the rows denoting the
participant’s own behaviour, the columns, the behaviour of others; closely
paralleling Van Vugt et al., (1995), the majority was defined as 60 per cent of the
other commuters. Participants subsequently rated, in a new 262 table, each of the
four situations on a scale from 750 (extremely unattractive) to +50 (extremely
attractive). Because they are more continuous, ratings as opposed to ranks were used
in the computation of the three preference indices, preference for self, preference for
others, and preference for coordination, as outlined in the Introduction. The general
terms ‘attractive’ and ‘unattractive’ were used to provide participants a wide degree
of latitude in interpreting the commuting situation; accordingly, this matrix is taken
as an indication of effective matrix preferences. Later in the survey—following the
scenario questionnaire described below—participants were asked to rank and rate
the same four commuting situations, solely in terms of travel time and then comfort,
respectively. These two matrices, accordingly labelled the travel time matrix and the
comfort matrix, were taken as indicators of two different ‘framings’ of given matrix.
The ranking and rating procedure for these latter matrices was nearly identical to
that described earlier for the effective matrix; however, in the case of both the travel
time matrix and the comfort matrix, participants entered ranks and ratings in the
same matrix. The effective matrix was presented prior to travel time and comfort
matrices, as we did not want the latter framings to influence effective matrix
preferences.
Questionnaires
Following the effective matrix rating task, and preceding the travel time and comfort
matrix rating tasks, participants completed a scenario questionnaire. Using a 7-point
Likert scale (1=not at all, 7=very much), participants first rated the extent to which
five travel attributes including comfort, travel time, flexibility, environmental
impact, and public health influenced their ranking and scaling decisions. Participants
then indicated the probability ‘from 0 to 100’ that they would take their car to work
in the commuting scenario, assuming they knew nothing about the behaviour of
other commuters. Participants also estimated the percentage of other commuters
they expected to commute by car.
Following the travel time and comfort matrix tasks, participants answered a
number of questions regarding their current commuting experiences, including (a)
whether they had a car, (b) whether they currently commuted to work, and if so, by
what means, (c) what their real-life commuting preference was (1=very strong
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preference for public transportation to 7=very strong preference for the car) and (d)
the probability, from 0 to 100, that they would take public transportation in the
future. Respondents were thanked for their participation and debriefed by way of
mailed feedback.
RESULTS
Effect of matrix on preference for self, others, and coordination
The first purpose of the current study was to demonstrate that personal concerns
might influence the nature of the interdependence underlying the decision to
commute by car versus public transportation. We conducted a multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) examining the influence of matrix frame (travel time versus
comfort versus effective matrix) on participants’ preference for self, others, and
coordination. The three-level within-subject factor of matrix frame was partitioned
into two contrasts, one comparing travel time to comfort matrices, the second
comparing the effective to the average of travel time and comfort matrices. The
travel time versus comfort comparison addresses the determinants of the given
matrix; that is, how differing personal commuting concerns may affect the
interdependence features perceived by commuters. The effective versus travel time/
comfort contrast would provide initial evidence of transformation from given to
effective matrix; that is, how preferences shift when commuters are allowed to bring
broader considerations to bear on the commuting decision. As expected, the analysis
revealed a significant multivariate effect of matrix frame, F(6,78)=14.85, p50.001,
indicating that preference for self, others, and coordination were generally affected
by participants’ most salient concern (i.e. travel time, comfort, or global
preference—the effective matrix). Focusing on the determinants of the given
matrix, univariate analyses on each preference index revealed that travel time versus
comfort matrices influenced both preference for self, and preference for others.
Consistent with hypothesis 1a, participants exhibited a significantly higher self
preference for the car, irrespective of others’ choices, when comfort (M=24.15,
S.D.=35.04), rather than travel time (M=9.37, S.D.=37.92), was the primary
concern, F(1,83)=14.53, p50.001. However, contrary to hypothesis 1b, participants
did not show a higher preference for avoiding other commuters when travel time
(M=30.89, S.D.=27.34) as opposed to comfort (M=28.96, S.D.=23.28) was the
primary concern, F(1,83)=0.53, n.s. Finally, consistent with hypothesis 1c,
participants exhibited a significantly higher preference for others to commute by
public transportation (denoted by negative values), when travel time (M=715.02,
S.D.=26.03) rather than comfort (M=3.86, S.D.=22.54) was the primary concern,
F(1,83)=32.86, p50.001. Taken together, these results indicate that differing travel
concerns can affect perception of the given matrix.
As initial evidence for a transformation from given to effective matrix, we
compared preference for self, others, and coordination in the effective versus travel
time and comfort matrices combined. An examination of the means revealed that,
relative to the travel time and comfort matrices combined, the effective matrix was
characterized by a lower self preference for the car (ME=72.46, S.D.=36.37,
MTC=16.76, S.D.=31.89), a stronger preference for others to commute by
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public transportation (denoted by negative values) (ME=729.96, S.D.=34.07,
MTC=75.58, S.D.=19.10), and a lower preference for avoiding other commuters
(ME=19.79, S.D.=27.63, MTC=29.92, S.D.=22.32); respective F(1,83)s=35.15 for
self, 40.44 for others, and 10.55 for coordination (all ps50.005). These results
provide initial support for a transformation of the given matrix, based on individual
(i.e. self-interested) concerns and preferences, into an effective matrix based on
broader (i.e. collective) concerns.
Effects of social value orientation and trust on effective matrix preferences
The second purpose of the present study was to examine two possible determinants of
effective matrix preferences by examining the roles of social value orientation and
trust on the perceived nature of the interdependence underlying the commuting
decisions. To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, regarding the main effect of social value
orientation, the three effective matrix preference indices (self, others, and
coordination) were employed as multiple dependent measures in a 2 (social value
orientation: prosocial versus proself)62 (trust: low versus high) MANOVA. This
analysis revealed, first, no significant main effect for social value orientation, at either
the multivariate (F51) or the univariate level (all Fs51), contrary to hypotheses 2a
and 2b. The analysis did reveal, however, a multivariate main effect of trust,
F(3,80)=3.79, p50.05. Univariate tests revealed a significant main effect of trust on
preference for self, F(1,82)=4.41, p50.05, preference for others, F(1,82)=5.46,
p50.05, and preference for coordination, F(1,82)=7.90, p50.01. An examination of
the means revealed that, relative to individuals low in trust, those high in trust
exhibited a stronger self preference for public transportation (denoted by negative
values) (Mhigh=79.57, S.D.=32.52;Mlow=7.07, S.D.=38.54), a stronger preference
for others to commute by public transportation (denoted by negative values)
(Mhigh=737.49, S.D.=35.65;Mlow=719.15, S.D.=29.15), and a weaker preference
for avoiding other commuters (Mhigh=11.96, S.D.=26.51; Mlow=31.23, S.D.=
29.51). While the trust by social value orientation interaction was not significant at
the multivariate level, F(3,80)=2.07, p=0.11, univariate analysis revealed two
marginally significant interaction effects on preference for self, F(1,82)=3.61,
p50.07, and preference for avoiding others, F(1,82)=3.38, p50.07, respectively (the
interaction was not significant on the preference for others index, F(1,82)51).
To test the hypotheses 3a and 3b, preference for self, others, and coordination
were next used as multiple dependent measures in a one-way MANOVA, in which
the four groups (prosocial/high trust, prosocial/low trust, proself/high trust, proself/
low trust) served as a single four-level between-subjects variable. At the multivariate
level, results revealed a significant effect only on the contrast between high-trust
prosocials and the remaining three groups, F(3,80)=5.45, p50.005. Univariate tests
revealed significant effects for this comparison on preference for self, others, and
coordination (respective Fs (1,82)=6.12, p50.05; 4.66, p50.05; 12.96, p50.001).
Means on each preference index, and the corresponding standard deviations, for the
four groups are displayed in Table 2.
Consistent with hypothesis 3a, the top row of Table 2 reveals that high-trust
prosocials exhibited a lower self preference for the car—indeed preferring public
transportation (M=713.95)—compared to the remaining groups combined. In
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support of hypothesis 3b, the bottom row of Table 2 reveals that high-trust
prosocials also exhibited a lower preference for avoiding other commuters when
compared to the remaining three groups. While not predicted, a similar pattern was
also observed for the preference for others, with high-trust prosocials exhibiting the
strongest preference for others to commute by public transportation. Multivariate
tests for the remaining contrasts (i.e. low-trust prosocials versus proselfs, and low-
versus high-trust proselfs) were all non-significant, as were all univariate tests on
each preference index.
Effective and given matrix preferences and the intention to commute by car
The third purpose of the current study was to assess the relative importance of the
effective matrix preferences, and provide evidence in support of the claim that the
effective matrix preferences are more predictive of commuting intentions than are
those from the given matrix. In pursuit of this goal, we first computed simple
correlations between all nine preference indices—self, others, and coordination, from
each of the three matrices—and stated probability of taking the car, as shown in the
first row of Table 3.
A visual inspection of these correlations reveals that the effective matrix
preferences as a set appear to be more closely associated with intention to use the
car than do the preferences from either of the given matrices. Further correlations,
not reported in the table, revealed reliable relationships between preference for self
(PS), preference for others (PO), and preference for coordination (PC) within the
effective matrix (PS, PO=0.44**; PS, PC=0.23*; PO, PC=36**; where *p50.05,
**p50.01, two-tailed), as well as between the effective matrix preferences and those in
the comfort and travel time matrices respectively (PSEC=0.62**, POEC=0.10 n.s.,
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Table 2. Effective matrix preferences as a function of social value orientation and trust
Social value orientation
Proself Prosocial
Low High Low High
Preference index trust trust trust trust
Preference for selfa Mean 0.48 71.09 17.63 713.95
S.D. 35.41 41.36 42.17 26.62
Preference for othersb Mean 719.82 732.97 717.97 739.82
S.D. 33.65 34.73 21.08 36.45
Preference for Mean 28.69 22.65 35.30 6.44
coordinationc S.D. 32.28 24.86 24.96 26.00
N 24 16 15 31
aPreference for self values greater (less) than 0 indicate a personal overall preference for the car (public
transportation).
bPreference for others values greater (less) than 0 indicate an overall preference for others to commute by
car (public transportation).
cPreference for coordination values greater (less) than 0 indicate a preference for avoiding (joining) other
commuters.
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Table 3. Correlations between given and effective matrix preference indices, probability of taking the car, and concern with various travel attributes
Effective matrix Given matrix (comfort) Given matrix (travel time)
preference indices preference indices preference indices
P(Car) PSe POe PCe PSc POc PCc PSt POt PCt
P(Car) 1.00 0.61** 0.32** 0.39** 0.43** 0.19 0.08 0.48** 0.04 0.19
Comfort 0.51** 0.32** 0.21 0.36** 0.28** 0.09 0.32** 0.26* 70.08 0.31**
Travel time 0.28** 0.21 0.00 0.12 0.31** 70.12 0.10 0.21 70.25* 0.03
Flexibility 0.44** 0.44** 0.14 0.21 0.22* 70.02 0.01 0.22* 70.03 0.14
Environment 70.51** 70.64** 70.40** 70.38** 70.46** 70.14 70.06 70.30** 70.06 70.11
Public health 70.37** 70.42** 70.30** 70.45** 70.30** 70.12 70.15 70.21 70.07 70.25*
Note. N=84; P(Car), probability of taking the car; PS, preference for self (higher values indicate a stronger preference for the car); PO, preference for others (higher
values indicate a stronger preference for others to commute by car); PC, preference for coordination (higher values indicate a stronger preference for avoiding other
commuters). *p50.05 **p50.01, two-tailed.
PCEC=0.34**; PSET=0.48**, POET=0.25*, PCET=0.29**; where *p50.05,
**p50.01, two-tailed). The intercorrelations of the effective matrix preferences,
and the partial overlap between the given and effective matrix preferences, raise two
theoretically-relevant issues. First, given their intercorrelations, it is relevant to ask
whether a particular effective matrix preference (say for coordination) is important,
once the remaining (effective matrix) preferences have been taken into account.
Indeed, one of the main assumptions of the present interdependence approach is that
factors above and beyond simply an individual’s overall self preference are important
factors in ultimate commuting intentions. Second, in light of the overlap between the
given and effective matrix preferences, it seems reasonable to ask whether the effective
matrix preferences—which are assumed to be more closely linked to behaviour—can
sufficiently account for intended behaviour, above and beyond the personal
preferences expressed in the two given matrices.
To address these issues, we conducted a two-step regression analysis. First, to
assess the relative importance of the effective matrix preferences, a simultaneous
regression analysis was performed in which stated probability of taking the car in
the commuting scenario was regressed on the set of three effective matrix
preferences. Consistent with hypothesis 4a, the analysis revealed a significant
(positive) relationship between self preference and stated probability of taking the
car (beta=0.56, t=5.99, p50.001), over and above the effects of preference for
others, and preference for coordination. The positive beta weight indicates, as
predicted, that a stronger self preference for the car was associated with a higher
stated probability of commuting by car. More importantly, and consistent with
hypothesis 4b, the analysis also revealed a significant relationship between the
preference for coordination index and stated probability estimates (beta=0.26,
t=2.91, p50.01), over and above the effect of preference for self, and preference
for others. The positive beta weight for the preference for coordination index
indicates, as predicted, that an increasing desire to avoid other commuters is
associated with a higher probability of taking the car. The preference for others
index was not reliably related to probability of taking the car, once preference for
self, and preference for coordination has been controlled for (beta=70.02,
t=70.16, n.s.). As a set, the three effective matrix preferences explained 43.8 per
cent of the variance in stated probability of taking the car, overall F(3,80)=20.75,
p50.0001, adjusted R2=0.42.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the effective matrix preferences would be more closely
linked to behaviour than the preferences from either of the given matrices. To
determine whether any of the given matrix preferences added to the prediction of
intention to commute by car, over and above the effective matrix preferences, the
remaining six preference indices (self, others, and coordination, from both travel
time and comfort matrices) were entered into the model. Of these, only the
preference for self from the travel time matrix proved to be a reliable predictor
(beta=0.33, t=3.20, p50.005). Furthermore, both preference for self, and
preference for coordination from the effective matrix remained significant
predictors in the presence of the given matrix preferences (for self preference,
beta=0.38, t=2.91, p50.005; for coordination preference, beta=0.19, t=2.04,
p50.05). As a set, the nine preference indices explained 51.9 per cent of the variance
in stated probability of taking the car, overall F(9,74)=8.87, p50.0001, adjusted
R2=0.46; F(6,74) change=1.09, n.s. Alternatively, when the given matrix
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preferences were entered on a first step—F(6,77)=6.16, p50.001, R2=0.324,
adjusted R2=0.272—and the main effective matrix preferences were added on a
second step, F(3,74) change=5.98, p50.01. As a set, these latter results provide
support for the proposition that the effective matrix is more closely associated with
intended behaviour than is the given matrix.
Correlational analyses addressing the relationship between the given and effective
matrices
Finally, in a more exploratory vein, to get a broader picture of the transformation
from given to effective matrix, we computed correlations between all nine preference
indices and participants’ stated concern with five travel attributes, as well as their
stated probability of commuting by car (see bottom five rows of Table 3). The
most noteworthy aspect of these correlations is the way in which the travel
attribute–preference index relationships change from the given to effective matrices.
First, consistent with the notion that the effective matrix involved a transformation
based on collective concerns, participants’ stated concern with the environment and
public health appears to be more strongly related to the effective, as opposed to the
given matrix preferences. By contrast, participants’ stated concern with comfort,
travel time and flexibility respectively (i.e. individual commuting concerns) appears
to be equally related to the given and effective matrix preferences. To determine
which of these differences were reliable, we compared the strength of each travel
attribute–preference index relationship in the effective matrix with the same travel
attribute–preference index relationship in each of the given matrices, following
procedures outlined by Steiger (1980). That is, we conducted 5 (travel attribute)63
(preference index)62 (contrast: effective versus travel time, effective versus
comfort)=30 comparisons between dependent correlations. Focusing on the
collective concerns (i.e. environment and public health), results revealed that in
nine out of the 12 cases, the travel attribute–preference index relationship was
significantly stronger (p50.05, one-tailed) in the effective, as opposed to either of the
given matrices. The exceptions, which all involved the public health attribute,
included the (subscripted) comparisons on preference for selfE–C, preference for
othersE–C, and preference for coordinationE–T. Turning attention to the individual
concerns (i.e. comfort, travel time and flexibility), results revealed that in only four of
the 18 cases was the travel attribute–preference index relationship stronger in the
effective as opposed to the given matrices; these included one (subscripted)
comparison involving the attribute comfort (preference for othersE–T), and three
comparisons involving flexibility (preference for selfE–C, preference for selfE–T, and
preference for coordinationE–C). Taken together, these results suggest that the
effective matrix indeed involves a transformation based on collective concerns.
DISCUSSION
The current research advanced an interdependence analysis of commuting decisions
(i.e. commuting by car versus public transportation), delineating the determinants of
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an individual’s outcomes—collectively known as the interdependence structure—in
terms of own decisions, other commuters’ decisions, and the combination or
interaction of own and others’ decisions (cf. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Additionally,
this analysis postulated two levels of interdependence structures, the first based on
personal (i.e. self-interested) commuting concerns such as travel time and comfort
(i.e. the given matrix), the second based on broader considerations including social
value orientations and trust (i.e. the effective matrix).
Within the given matrix, results generally supported our hypotheses. Compared to
a concern with travel time, a concern with comfort was associated a stronger self
preference for the car, and a weaker preference for others to commute by public
transportation, supporting hypotheses 1a and 1c, respectively. However, in contrast
to hypothesis 1b, travel time did not increase the desire to avoid other commuters.
Within the effective matrix, we failed to find evidence for the prediction that social
value orientation (alone) would influence self preference for the car, and preference
for avoiding other commuters, disconfirming hypotheses 2a and 2b, respectively.
Nevertheless, findings did support the prediction that prosocials with high trust,
relative to the other three groups, would show the greatest personal preference for
public transportation (hypothesis 3a), and the lowest concern with avoiding other
commuters (hypothesis 3b). This group also demonstrated the greatest preference for
others to commute by public transportation. Our findings also supported the claim
that not only self preference (hypothesis 4a) but also preference for coordination
(hypothesis 4b) make independent contributions in predicting commuting intentions.
Finally, the findings revealed some preliminary evidence that given matrix
preferences are less predictive of commuting intentions than are effective matrix
preferences; that is, after the presumed ‘transformation process’ on the basis of
broader considerations has been taken into account. Taken together, the results
of our analysis suggest (a) the validity of distinguishing between two levels of
interdependence structures, the first based on personal concerns and preferences, the
second based on broader considerations; (b) the importance of accounting for
multiple individual differences in the perception of interdependence structures; and
(c) the usefulness of moving from a purely individual analysis of commuting
behaviour to one recognizing the importance of interdependence among commuters.
Each of these conclusions is discussed in turn.
For some time, researchers interested in interdependent decision-making have
distinguished between two levels of interdependence structures to account for the
fact that, despite the temptation to behave in a purely selfish fashion, some
individuals do behave in a collectively-beneficial fashion (e.g. Kelley & Thibaut,
1978). To date, evidence for this transformation process has been promising (e.g.
Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Rusbult,
Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), but
nonetheless indirect (for an exception, see Yovetich & Rusbult, 1994). The present
results provide somewhat more direct evidence in support of such a transformation
process: when allowed to interpret commuting decisions broadly, without respect to
a particular concern such as comfort or travel time, participants’ perception of the
interdependence structure revealed notably more cooperative preferences.
The shift toward a more cooperative interdependence structure is even more
interesting in light of the fact that this structure (i.e. the effective matrix) was
meaningfully related to individual differences in trust (e.g. Yamagishi, 1986), and
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more importantly, the combination of trust and social value orientation (Messick &
McClintock, 1968). First, relative to individuals with low trust, individuals with high
trust exhibited a lower overall preference for the car, a lower concern with avoiding
other commuters, and a higher preference for others to commute by public
transportation. These results add to a growing body of literature indicating that high
levels of trust are associated with higher levels of cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g.
Brann & Foddy, 1987; Parks, 1994; Yamagishi, 1986). More importantly, and
consistent with our predictions, the present results revealed that social value
orientation and trust combined to influence effective matrix preferences. The latter
result is important for at least three reasons. First, the combined effect of social value
orientation and trust provides support for Pruitt and Kimmel’s (1977) goal/
expectation theory which states that cooperation in social dilemmas is enhanced to
the degree that individuals hold both the goal of cooperating and the expectation
that one’s cooperation will be reciprocated. The logic underlying the goal/
expectation hypothesis has primarily been tested in the context of two-person,
experimentally created social dilemmas. As such, the current study helps to extend
the social dilemma literature by demonstrating the relevance of this hypothesis in an
n-person, real-world setting. Second, the present results contribute to more general
work on the role of personality in prosocial behaviour. The current work, by
demonstrating the combined effect of trust and social value orientation on
commuting preferences, suggests the importance of examining multiple
dispositional measures when attempting to understand prosocial behaviour (cf.
Knight, Johnson, Carlo, & Eisenberg, 1994; Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Staub, 1978).
Finally, the present findings may have important real-world implications. For
instance, past public advertising campaigns emphasizing the importance of behaving
in a socially-responsible fashion have not been terribly effective at increasing the use
of alternatives to the car (e.g. Baerwald, 1985; Kostyniuk, 1982). The present results
suggest that some people (i.e. those with a prosocial orientation) may be more likely
to respond to such campaigns, if the campaigns concurrently attempt to bolster the
public’s trust that other commuters will also ‘pitch in’. Encouraging individuals with
a proself orientation, on the other hand, to behave in a prosocial fashion may require
an additional emphasis on the personal benefits associated with commuting by
public transportation, or the personal costs associated with commuting by car (cf.
Van Vugt et al., 1995).
The final result we wish to discuss centres on the relationship between the effective
matrix preferences and commuting intentions. That participants’ overall preference
for the car versus public transportation predicted stated intention to commute by car
is reasonable, and not too surprising. What is more important, however, is that the
desire to avoid other commuters was also associated with stated intention to
commute by car, over and above, overall commuting preference. This is an
important result for two reasons. First, the finding may have interesting policy
implications. Specifically, public information campaigns stressing the desirability of
avoiding others, on the assumption that people would thus opt for public
transportation, may backfire. Indeed, raising the salience of self-serving
coordination may increase commuters’ desire for the car. Why self-serving
coordination is associated with a higher preference for the car, is a good question.
One possible answer is that a heightened emphasis on avoiding other commuters
increases the desire to exert control over the commuting environment, control which
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may be perceived as more likely behind the wheel of a car than on public
transportation (cf. Van Vugt et al., in press). At a more general level, the unique
contribution of coordination preferences supports the importance of assessing more
than just an individual’s overall preference (i.e. reflexive control). Indeed, one may
all too quickly assume that real-life interdependent situations have a structure in
which coordination (i.e. behaviour control) is relatively small. The relative absence
of behaviour control, for example, can be seen in the more restrictive definition of a
social dilemma as a situation in which (a) each individual receives greater individual
outcomes by choosing the non-cooperative alternative, regardless of others’ decisions,
yet (b) all individuals would receive larger outcomes if all would choose the
cooperative alternative (Dawes, 1980)4. While this model of social dilemmas is often
applied to a host of real-world problems, a closer inspection might reveal that many
of those situations, while sharing some features of social dilemmas (so defined), may
be experienced as a situation in which coordination is also important (e.g. the
chicken dilemma; Liebrand, 1983). This seems especially relevant in situations like
the present one in which there is potential for congestion, and in situations where an
optimal level of cooperation can be identified (e.g. escaping from a burning movie
theatre, utilizing a replenishable resource, or providing a step-level public good).
Before closing, we wish to outline some strengths and limitations of the present
study. The relatively small percentage of commuters who completed the survey—
after agreeing to participate—was disappointing. Moreover, it may call into question
the representativeness of the sample. It might be argued, for example, that prosocials
may have been more willing than proselfs to participate in the study (cf. McClintock
& Allison, 1989). However, the distribution of social value orientations in the present
study was consistent with that of other studies using a similar measurement
technique (e.g. Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). On a different note, the use of a
hypothetical commuting scenario, while not uncommon in the transportation
literature (e.g. Fenwick et al., 1983; Norman, 1977; Norman & Louviere, 1974; Van
Vugt et al., in press), deserves mention. Given our goal of examining perceptions of
the given and effective matrices, standardizing the commuting situation via a
scenario was necessary and arguably beneficial. Had the commuting situation not
been standardized, differences in perceived interdependence structure could not
unambiguously have been attributed to social value orientations and trust.
Despite its potential limitations, the present study has a number of strengths. As
noted above, the current study helps to extend research on commuting decisions,
social dilemmas and prosocial behaviour in general. Moreover, the present study
demonstrates an analytic tool which can help advance recent work aimed at
understanding real-world interdependence structures. Despite the desirability of such
an endeavour, little research has directly examined decision makers’ perception of
real-world interdependence structures. In one interesting exception, Plous (1993)
asked U.S. senators to rate the attractiveness of four possible outcomes of the
Nuclear Arms Race: (a) both countries arm, (b) both countries disarm, (c) U.S.
arms, Soviet Union disarms, (d) U.S. disarms, Soviets arm. Contrary to the
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4It should be noted that, even within this restrictive definition of a social dilemma, behaviour control can
exist, despite the fact that an individual is always better off choosing the non-coopertive alternative,
regardless of others’ decisions. The lack of a ‘crossing interaction’ does not rule out the possibility of some
degree of behaviour control. We simply wish to point out that the application of the more restrictive social
dilemma model to real-world problems often overlooks the importance of behaviour control.
commonly cited Prisoner’s Dilemma model (e.g. Brams, 1985), Plous discovered that
the Arms Race reflected a ‘Perceptual Dilemma’ in which the U.S. most preferred
mutual disarmament, while believing that the (then) Soviet Union preferred unilateral
armament. The discrepancy between the theoretical and ‘empirical’ model illustrated
in Plous’ study is an important one, as the two models are likely to lead to different
questions and/or suggestions regarding the underlying mechanisms responsible for
behaviour in such contexts. The present analysis helps to extend this line of research
in two distinct ways. Whereas Plous’ analysis averaged over respondents, the present
analysis systematically examined differences in perceived interdependence structures.
Furthermore, instead of identifying a particular interdependence structure, such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Perceptual Dilemma, the current analysis offered a
means of capturing interdependence in terms of three meaningfully interpretable
components, an approach we hope will serve as a model for the formal analysis of
behaviour in additional interdependent settings. At a more general level, the present
results help demonstrate that interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978),
which has typically been applied to dyadic interpersonal relationships, can also
provide a useful framework in which to understand behaviour in multi-person
interdependence contexts such as commuting decisions.
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